Stop AI agents from making unauthorized changes in production.

Agentic AI governance is the set of controls that decides what an AI agent may change on the systems it works on, stops the changes it may not make and keeps a record of both. It differs from AI governance in the policy sense, which covers model selection, data handling and acceptable use. The question that decides outcomes is narrower: when an agent with valid credentials attempts a change, what checks it before it executes?

Excessive Agency is OWASP's name for the vulnerability that lets an AI agent take damaging actions in response to unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated model output, whatever caused the model to misbehave. OWASP traces it to three root causes: excessive functionality, excessive permissions and excessive autonomy. Agentic AI governance addresses all three, and adds a check on the change itself where it executes.

No. Securing the model governs what it says. Agentic AI governance governs what a deployed agent is allowed to do to production. Mimic works on the second: it stops the unauthorized changes an agent attempts when it's prompted badly, hallucinates or is manipulated, regardless of how the model was built. Prompt filtering is a model-layer control, and the two work together.

Yes. Endpoint detection asks whether activity looks malicious, and it's good at that. An agent with a valid credential and an approved tool can make a damaging change that looks like ordinary administration, so it may not resemble anything a detection rule is written to catch. Agentic AI governance asks a different question at the moment of change: was this change authorized? Run both.

A second agent can't reliably govern a malfunctioning one, because the control over an unpredictable system has to be deterministic. A second agent can be prompted, confused or misled just like the one it watches. Mimic enforces a fixed known-good model instead, and the same check gives the same answer every time, whatever the agent was told.

The unauthorized changes a malfunctioning, manipulated or badly prompted agent makes on the systems Mimic protects: deleted data, an altered configuration or a command it was never meant to run. What matters isn't whether the agent is malicious but whether its change falls outside the scope approved for it. Actions an agent takes through a cloud provider's or SaaS API, on systems Mimic doesn't run on, are outside it.

Threat detection tries to recognize bad actions, a list that keeps growing, so it's always chasing the next one. Known-good enforcement defines what each system is authorized to do and stops changes outside it. It doesn't need to predict what an attacker or an agent will try next, because the test is the same every time: was this change authorized?

AI agents act through the same legitimate pathways as authorized administrators, so controls at the application layer can't tell an unauthorized agent change from an authorized one. Every change to a protected system passes through the kernel. Mimic checks it there against the system's known-good state and decides inline, before the change executes.

Yes. Mimic treats every unauthorized change the same way, whether it comes from ransomware, an AI agent or a person having a bad day. If the change falls outside the system's known-good state, it doesn't run. Mimic Ransomware Defense applies that check to ransomware, and Mimic AI Guardrails applies it to agents.

Through Virtual Patching, a separate solution in the Mimic Platform. It closes the exposure that AI-accelerated vulnerability discovery opens before a vendor patch exists. It works in two forms, both built on a baseline: disruption blocks the specific mechanism an analyzed vulnerability depends on, and containment limits what an exploit can do once it lands.

Mimic allows the changes inside each agent's approved scope and the system's known-good state, so authorized automation keeps running. It stops only changes outside that scope, which is what separates enforcement from a lockdown. Enforcement overhead is tunable. Because the decision happens inline at the kernel, there's no approval queue for an agent to wait in.

Yes. Mimic keeps a sequenced record of what each agent attempted, what ran and what was stopped, captured at the kernel as enforcement happens. You can show leadership and auditors what an agent tried to do and what was blocked. For protected critical applications, Mimic also creates a restore point the moment it detects an unauthorized change.